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NOTES AND COMMENTS

USURY. USURY IN VENDOR CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Suppose that B, Buyer, wants to purchase an automobile from S, Seller
for a purchase price of $1,500 but B has only $500 cash to pay down;
B may finance the remaining $1,000 balance one of two general ways:
(1) He may borrow the $1,000 directly from F, Finance Company or
Bank at say a charge of $100, loan to be repaid in twelve equal monthly
installments of $91.67 each; or (2) he may execute a note and security
agreement with S and pay directly to S the $91.67 per month. The first
transaction is clearly within the usury statutes because it involves a "loan
or forbearance of money".' The second, however, is not subject to the
usury statutes because the transaction was one of sale rather than a loan
of money. 2 It is this second transaction that is the subject of this paper.
Oklahoma has exempted this second transaction - - - the credit sale
- - - from the usury statutes by invoking the doctrine that a seller may
offer an article at two different prices, a cash price and a time and/or
credit price.3 The fact that the time price exceeds the cash price by an
amount representing interest greater than the statute allows is deemed
immaterial on the theory that the credit sale is merely a sale at a higher
price which the seller is entitled to charge to cover the risks of selling on
time.4 The non-loan nature of the credit sale is not altered by the fact
S, to avoid having his working capital tied up, may transfer his interest to
F at a discount.5 However, if B attempts to borrow money from F and F
has B finance the purchase through S by means of an installment contract
which is later assigned to F, the transaction will then be subject to the
usury laws.6
Since the lender credit laws7 are inapplicable to vendor credit and the
absence in Oklahoma of any legislation specialized to the regulation of
1
OKLA. STAT. tit 15, S 264 (1961): "Interest is the compensation allowed
for the use or forbearance or detention of money, or its equivalent."
2 Cobb v. Baxter, 292 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1956); Henry v. P. & E. Fin. Co.,
197 Okla. 676, 174 P.2d 373 (1946); GMAC v. Mid-West Chevrolet Co., 66
F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1933).
3 Henry v. P. & E. Fin. Co., supra note 2; Mondie v. GMAC, 178 Okla. 584,
63 P.2d 708 (1937); Huseman v. Universal Credit Co., 178 Okla. 168, 62 P.2d

485 4(1937).
The pioneer case expounding this theory is the early English case of Beete

v. Bidgood, 7 B&C 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (KB. 1827). The backbone of the
United State's cases is the early Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861).
Most of the leading cases are collected in 143 A.L.R. 238 (1943).

5 See Carolina Industrial Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d
692 (1963), citing similar holdings in a number of jurisdictions.
6Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 90 Va. App. 352, 83 SE.2d 76

(1954); McCalister v. Columbia Credit Co., 84 A.2d 108 (Munic. Ch. App. D.C.
1951); Nazarian v. Lincoln Fin. Corp., 78 A2d 7 (R.I. 1951).
7 Small Loan Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 280.1-.29 (1961); Credit Unions,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §§ 395.1-.18 (1961); Pawnbrokers, Okla. Stat. tit. 21 §S
1091-1093 (1961); Savings and Loan, OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 233, 244 (1961).
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vendor credit,8 the only prescriptions applicable to consumer credit sale
transactions are those which are applied to commercial sales transactions
generally. In Oklahoma these prescriptions are generally within the Uniform Commercial Code.9 But the adoption of the U.C.C., has no effect on
the .usury laws. 10 Since the courts have denied relief under the usury
statutes by their application of the time price doctrine, Oklahoma is without- a regulatory scheme of management regarding vendor credit, transactions.
The inequalities in Oklahoma vendor credit transactions are apparent.
The commercial buyer is put on an even plane with the consumer buyer.
The commercial buyer with his knowledge, experience and resources is in
a much better bargaining position to negotiate for results which he can, at
least, predict. But when the same general commercial laws are applied to
the consumer buyer, the results are, more often than not, unexpected and
disappointing. It may be true that the consumer buyer can find it quite
simple to obtain credit, but he has virtually no bargaining position as to
the terms of such credit. A .large number of states have recognized just
such inequalities and have passed laws dealing exclusively with consumer
credit sale transactions."
The need for such legislation is made more apparent as we watch the
court struggle-with the problem of determining whether a particular credit
transaction is one of loan or of sale. In two states, Arkansas 12 and Nebraska' 3 the court has given up trying to distinguish the loan transaction
from the sale transaction, at least for the purpose of apply the usury laws.
As a result, the two transactions discussed before are both considered loans
in those two states. In the rest of14the states, Oklahoma included, the timeprice doctrine has been affirmed.
To better understand this doctrine, we quote the North Carolina Supreme court directly from a recent case:
In interpreting (usury]. laws in relation to [vendor credit] trans8
Oklahoma
9

has no major legislation resembling an Installment Sales Act.
0KxLA. STAT. tit. 12A, S 1-9 (1961), hereinafter referred to as the U.C.C.

10 Cooper v. Cherokee Village Dev. Co., 236 Ark. 37, 364 S.W.2d 158 (1963).

OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A § 9-201 (1961) (The Secured Transaction section of the

U.C.C.): "Nothing in this Article validates any change or practice illegal under
any statute or regulation thereunder governing usury . . . or extends the applica-

tion of any such statute or regulation." It should be noted that this exemption is
specifically stated in the Secured Transaction Article of the U.C.C. Usury is still
a valid defense to one other than a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument
under Article 3 of the U.C.C. OKLA. STAT. tit 12A, §§ 3-305 & 06 (1961). Presumably usury will not be disregarded in striking down "unconscionable' bargains under the Sales Article of the U.C.C. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-302
(1961).
11
12

13

CuRRAN, TRENDs iN CONSUMR CREDrr LEGISLAnON, 254-55

See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.

(1965).

See text accompanying notes 28-34 infra.

14 See text accompanying notes 2 & 3 infra.
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actions ... there have been declared by the great weight of
authority, the following principles:
(1) Usury can only attach to a loan of money or to forbearance
of a debt.
(2) A vendor may fix on his property one price for cash and
another for credit, and the mere fact that the credit price
exceeds the cash price by a greater percentage than is
permitted by the usury laws is a matter of concern to the
parties and not to the courts, barring evidence of bad
faith.
(3) Usury cannot be predicated upon the fact that property is
sold upon a credit at an advance over what would be
charged in case of a cash sale so long as it appears that
the price charged is in fact fixed for the purchase of goods
on credit with no intention or purpose of defeating the
usury laws even though the difference between the cash
price and the credit price, if considered as interest, amounts
to more than the legal rate.
(4) A bona fide credit sale upon an installment payment basis
does not involve a loan of money or a forbearance of a
debt within the meaning and application of the usury laws.
(5) A finance company is not precluded from enforcing a
credit sale contract according to its terms, if valid between
the original parties, although the credit price exceeds the
cash price by more than the legal interest. And such
transaction is not converted into a loan by reason of the
fact that the finance company solicited such business
from the dealer and furnished forms for the contract, and if
the seller computes the finance charge in accordance with
a Table or schedule furnished by the finance company.' 5
The questions now arises: Why the time-price doctrine at all? Historically, the doctrine was predicted on the basis that a seller has an inherent
right to charge whatever price he pleases. Further, the buyer under a
credit sale contract is free to accept or reject the seller's offer; whereas,
the needy borrower subject to the loan acts, has no choice but to borrow
the money.'0 This stagnant approach has been carried forward by the blind
principles of stare decisis to today's modem world of big volume consumer buying. The approach is typified by the Missouri court in a 1960
case where they say:
The statute against usury is striking at forbidding the exaction
of receipt of more than a specified rate for the hire of money
and not anything else. And a purchaser is not like the needy
15 Carolina Industrial Bank v. Merrimon, supra note 5, at
at 698.
(Citations, op. cit. supra note 11, at 2-3.
6
1 CuRAN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 2-3.
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borrower, a victim of a rapacious lender, since be can refrain
from the purchase if he does not choose to pay the price
asked by the seller. 7
It is submitted that in today's modern world, one can be just as "needy"
of an automobile, washing machine, or various other consumer commodities, as one can be "needy" of a loan. 8
Further, to B in our two hypothetical situations set out above, there
is no economic difference between the interest charge and the credit
charge, both represent charges for buying on credit rather than paying
cash.' 9 In the first situation; B borrowed the money and used the proceeds
to buy merchandise. The entire money-use charge is interest and goes to
the benefit of F. This charge is intended to cover F's expenses plus yield
a fair return on his investment. In the second situation - - - the credit
sale contract - - - the amount paid by B to S as a credit charge is the same
as the interest collected by F in the first example. The situation is not the
20
same, however, where S has transferred his interest to F at a discount.
That portion that has been received by F can properly be regarded as interest since such payments are nothing more than charges for the use of
money.21 Any portion of the credit charge paid to S should also be regarded as interest. There appears no justifications for treating 5, who finances his own sale, differently. S is adding a credit charge to the cash
price in order to cover credit losses for B's non-payment and to provide a
charge for the use of his money. This is the same function of the interest
charged by F in the first situation and should be treated as such. Assuming
that in the second situation, S sold the note to F at a discount "with recourse" (thereby guaranteeing payment to F), S is still receiving payment
for the credit charge to the benefit of S and this should likewise be regarded as part of the total interest charge to B. To treat the credit charge
as interest no matter who receives it is more in keeping with the spirit
and purpose of the usury laws - - - protection of the borrowing public - - than to say that the credit charge paid to S is merely an increase in his
selling price.
The decisions in Nebraska2 3 and Arkansas 24 bear out this approach. An
examination of these decisions against each states' statutory requirements
7 Wyatt v. Commercial Credit Corp., 341 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Mo. 1960).
18 For an expansion of this viewpoint see Warren, Regulation of Finance

Charges in Retail Installment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839 (1959).
19 Id. at 842.
20
2 Project, 7 U.C.L.A.L REv. 618, 659 (1960).
1 Technically a finance company can never be anything but a lender because
the very nature of the finance company business is to "sell" money.
22 But in this situation, S is probably increasing his price, not for the purpose
of compensating himself for the credit risk he is taking, but to assure the sale
of th& paper to F.
23 See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.
24 See text accompanying notes 28-34 infra.
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may give some insight into the possible course of future Oklahoma action
in the field.
In 1952, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the case of Hare v. General Contract Purchase Co.25 In that case B executed a security agreement
and note to S for face amount of $1,439.13. S immediately thereafter discounted the note and security agreement to F for $1,150.00. The cash
price of the item was $1,150.00 so that the difference between the cash
price and the time price was $289.13. The court said that since the $289.13
i.e., the time price differential, exceeded the constitutional maximum interest rate of 10%, the contract was usurious. The court did not abolish the
time-price doctrine retroactively but did so by means of a caveat. The
court said that in the future if S, subsequent to his agreement with B,
transfers his interest to F and such transfer permits F to obtain more than
a 10% return of its investment, then a question of fact arises as to whether
S increased his cash price with the reasonable assurance that he could so
discount the paper to F. The court, in overruling much of the time-price
doctrine, gave as its reason: "What we are trying to do is to keep the spirit
against usury abreast of present day comof the constitutional 2mandate
6
mercial transactions.
In 1957, Arkansas extended the Hare doctrine in Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.27 The situation in that case was essentially the same as in the
second hypothetical set out at the beginning of this paper. The court said
that the constitutional prohibition against excessive interest charges applied not only to direct loans of money but also to any contract on which
a charge for credit was made, and therefore applied to a credit sale contract.
In Nebraska, the decisions are basically quite different from those of
Arkansas. Nebraska's decisions arose under a retail Installment Sales Act.
28
In 1963, the Nebraska Supreme Court, decided the case of Elder v. Doerr.
In this case it was stipulated that the facts showed a perfect time sale at
common law. It was further stipulated there was no misrepresentation, that
B was offered two prices, no finance company was involved, etc., so that
the transaction would qualify anywhere as a valid time sale.
The court held that finance charges made in compliance with the Insuch
stallment Sales Act were interest and that the provisions authorizing
29
charges were unconstitutional under the Nebraska constitution.

220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
,249 S.W.2d at 978.
27228 Ark. 464, 308 SW.2d 802 (1957).
28175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963), appeal dismissed, 377 U.S. 973
25

26 Id. at

(1964).

29 The Nebraska Installment Sales Act referred to is set out in NEB. RnV.
STATS. ch. 45, § 114-158 (1960).
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In this case the court upheld the time-price doctrine but refused to
apply it in this case because the time sale had not been made in good
faith, i.e., a contract made under a void statute.8 0 This decision along with
two decisions immediately following 3 ' only muddied the water as far as
any concrete determination of the status of the time-price doctrine in Nebraska was concerned.
In Lloyd v. GutgselP2 the court perhaps made its position dear. The
court said:
There seems to be an impression that if a cash price is quoted
and the buyer is unable to pay cash, it is then possible to apply
a certain schedule of rates or charges to the cash price in order
to determine the time sale price, the difference being denominated a time price differential. It is possible to do so if
the resulting charge does not exceed 9% simple interest. If it
does, we have a usurious transaction .... When we look through
the form, can we come to any other conclusion but the one that
the difference between the price and what the buyer finally
pays is the cost of carrying the balance of the cash price? To put
it another way, the charge is for the forbearance to collect the
full cash price, or for the use of33money. A rose is still a rose
though we may label it a violet
One would think then, that Nebraska vitiated the time-price doctrine.
But the court's refusal in the Lloyd s4 case to specifically overrule, by name,
the case which first established the doctrine in Nebraska, Grand Island
Fin. Co. v. Fowler,5 leaves some doubt yet. At least one writer thinks that
the doctrine is still in force, at least as to two individuals who want to
bargain at arms length 3 6 It is only when the right of the seller and the
buyer to agree has been completely submerged by mass financing from
frozen rate tables that the court feels this use of fixed tables of charges is
such a close resemblance to interest rates as to amount to the same
thing3

30

, 122 N.W.2d at 532-33.
at GMAC v. Mlackrill, 175 Neb. 631, 122 N.W.2d 742 (1963); Stanton v.
Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.2d 844 (1963), 16 STAN. L. REV. 1113 (1964)
32 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963).
31

Eider v. Doerr, supra note 28,

33 Id. at ., 124 N.W.2d at 203-04.
34 Lloyd v. Gutgsell, supra note 32.
247 N.W. 429 (1935).
Neb.
514,
S5 124
3

6Davis, Nebraska Installment Sales "Latest Installment", 18 PERSONtAL FIN.

'. Q. 4 (1963). Mr. Davis was counsel for the defendant in the Elder case, supra
note 28.

87 Id. at 6.
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In comparing the decisions in Arkansas and Nebraska as to any. effect
they may have on future Oklahoma vendor credit law, it would appear that
Arkansas rulings are to be the most closely scrutinized. In Arkansas, the
decision as to the nature of credit charges made for time payment sales
was made in the context of constitutional provisions specifying the maximum rate of interest allowable for loan contracts in Arkansas. 38
This is nearly identical with the Oklahoma Constitutional provision 3 9
The Arkansas legislature had no power to enact legislation which conflicted with the maximum prescribed in the constitution.40 The Oklahoma
legislature may very well be subject to the same prohibition.4'
In addition, prior to the Hare42 decision in Arkansas vendor credit
contracts in Arkansas were subject only to general commercial laws. As
discussed previously, this is exactly the situation in Oklahoma today. In
short, it would appear that the compelling reasons for the Hare4" decision
in Arkansas 44 are present in Oklahoma.
By contrast, it seems the only real statutory similiarity between Oklahoma and Nebraska is the constitutional provision in each state regarding

38

ARK. CoNsT. art. 19, § 13. "All contracts for a greater rate of interest than
(10%) per annum shall be void ... but when no rate of interest is agreed upon,
the rate shall be (6%) per annum."
39OKLA. CONST. art. XIV, § 2: "The legal rate of interest shall not exceed
(6%) per annum, in the absence of any contract rate of interest, and, by contract,
parties may agree upon any rate not to exceed (10%) per annum ......
40See Strickler v. State Auto Fin. Co., 220 Ark. 565, 249 S.W.2d 307 (1952),
wherein provisions of the Arkansas Small Loan Act which provided for service
charges and insurance charges was held to be in contravention of the Arkansas
Constitution. The court stated in the opinion: "We conclude that the service charge
of 24 dollars is illegal and an attempt to burden the necessitous borrower with excessive interest under another name. The legislature was therefore powerless to validate the charge." Id. at
-,
249 S.W.2d at 312. The court also held that insurance charges collected from the borrower were also illegal. The lender had required
the borrower to purchase life, accident and health insurance even though the borrower had already given the lender a chattel mortgage on household furniture. The
court said: "The act . . . attempts to authorize registrants to receive commissions
on insurance premiums as a profit on a loan in addition to the various other
charges authorized by the Act." Id. at
249 S.W.2d at 313.
In Winston v. Personal Fin. Co., 220 Ark. 580, 249 S.W.2d 315 (1952), the
court held that service charges which included travel expenses and inspection fees
as within the provision prohibiting usury.
Because of these decisions the Arkansas Small Loan Act was repealed. ARK.
STAT. tit. 67, ch. 13, § 1303-37 (1947) repealed by Ark. Acts 1953, no. 391,
sec. 41.
1
Oklahoma Small Loan Act, OKLA. STAT. tit, 15, S§ 280.1-29 (1961), is
quite similar to the Arkansas Act. The constitutionality of the Oklahoma Act has
never
42 been tested.
Hare v. General Contract Purchase Co., supra note 25.
43 Ibid.
4 See text accompanying note 26, supra.
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45
the passage of special legislation dealing with interest laws. This is of
no concern in Oklahoma at present because there is currently no major
46
special legislation in the field of vendor cerdit on the state statute books.
But should Oklahoma decide special legislation is needed in47 this area, a
constitutional amendment may very well be the only answer.

On June 22, 1964, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws announced that it had commenced ". .. an exhaustive

study of the entire field of consumer credit for the purpose of drafting
comprehensive uniform or model state legislation." 48 The impetus for this
study was provided in part by the Nebraska decisions, 49 and in part by the
bills entitled '"Truth in Lending," introduced in Congress by Senator
Douglas of Illinois.50 Let us hope that the Conference can come up with
a realistic program for solving the needs of the consumer as well as the
needs of financiers. It is a fact that much of todays "American way of
life" is being paid for on the installment plan.51 The reliance upon the
installment plan by the buying public has pointed up the need for effective consumer protection.
The type of legislation necessary to grant effective protection has not
been discussed, but it seems clear that the usury statutes have not brought
the protection needed. The time price doctrine has been more than efficient
in its blocking of effective enforcement of the usury laws. This is not to
say, however, that rigid enforcement of the usury statutes, i.e., a complete
4

5 OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 46: "The legislature shall not... pass any local or
special
law authorizing: ... fixing the rate interest."
4
6 But, according to traditional doctrine, the "special laws" provisions of state
constitutions (Oklahoma's special laws provision is set forth in note 45) require
that a reasonable basis be shown to sustain economic legislation which distinguishes
among members of a class. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), where
the federal rule was restated that acts of the legislature respecting economic legislation are not in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment unless shown to be arbitrary and "evincing invidious discrimination."
The Oklahoma court could sustain a time sale regulation which permits a
higher rate of interest than for others types of loan transactions on the rationale
that our economic system demands such treatment. But see Turney v. Goldberg's
Loan Office, 135 Okla. 147, 274 Pac. 464 (1929), where the court struck down
a pawnbroker's statute on the grounds that any statute attempting to authorize
pawnbrokers to charge over 10% ihterest is invalid under both art. V, sec. 46 (see
note 45 supra) and art XIV, sec. 2 (see note 39 supra.of the Oklahoma constitution)
There was no determination in this case whether service charges were to be considered interest.
47 This was the answer that Nebraska finally came up with. In November of
1964, the voters of Nebraska passed a constitutional amendment which gave the
legislature authority to separately define and classify loans and installment sales
and to establish maximum rates within the classifications of loans or installment
sales which it establishes. See Thone, Nebraska Installment Sales "Votcr Installment',
4 8 19 PERSONAL FIN. L Q. 21 (1964).
Buerger, Project on Retail Installment Sales, 18 PERSONAL FIN. L. 0.
(1964).
49 Discussed in text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
50 Buerger, op. cit. supra note 48 at 110.
51 Warren, op. cit. supra note 18.
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dismanteling of the time-price doctrine, is the answer. This would only
serve to threaten the flow of capital into installment credit.52 What is
needed is a realistic installment sales act aimed at establishing a balance
between the need of protecting consumers against exhorbitant finance
charges and the need of the finance companies to be recognized as a necessary element of today's consumer world. And, as previously discussed, the
first step in Oklahoma to effective consumer credit legislation must be a
constitutional amendment to allow the Oklahoma Legislature to enact the
"special" legislation which is required.
Should the Oklahoma courts "take the ball" from Arkansas and repudiate the time-price doctrine, then the constitutional interest provision in the
Oklahoma Constitution would also need amending. Without the timeprice doctrine, the constitutionality of an Installment Sales Act in Oklahoma is extremely doubtful and may even be per se unconstitutional.
William E. Naviaux

52 Ibis may not be a true statement because following the Hare decision in
Arkansas there was a significant increase in the automobile "paper" held by the
banks of that state. The four years following the decision saw the "paper" increase
from $9,662,000 to $19,344,000. This is surprising since the decrease in rates was
substantial. The reason for this rise is due probably to the fact that the lowering of
rates caused there to be more consumers ready to buy. It also cut down the losses
suffered by finance companies since from the bigger volume of buyers they could
select better credit risks. See 32 FORflHAm L REV. 587, 591 n.29 (1964).
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